and rising demand for labour -which are directly responsible for prosperity. Secondly, certain consequences of this affluence ar workers' social consciousness and conduct -for Millar, increasi their social importance, the decline of deference, independence visand so on. Then finally, these developments are in turn related to ce features of the current political situation -in 1790, the concern of to claim political as well as civil rights. In other words, und observations there is a theory -which he in fact develops more exp in his work2 -of the primarily economic determination of politic institutions, with changes in the objective and subjective aspects o cation being seen as a crucial mediating process.
A broadly comparable theory is, of course, central to the wo Engels. Indeed Millar may well have been an important influence i ment of Marx's sociological thinking.3 However, on the particular affluent worker, the interesting point is that this theoretical affinity complete reversal of perspective. Millar, as we have seen, regarded affluence of the labouring population as a threat to the establishe social ranks and to the political system associated with this. For Mi worker was a potentially dynamic factor in a relatively stable
Marx and Engels, on the other hand, the more prosperous stratum class was an essentially conservative element, hindering the growth class consciousness and of a revolutionary working-class move holding back the inevitable crisis of capitalist society. Engels, in particular, gave a good deal of attention to this probl class conservatism in his writings of the 1870s and 1880s. 4 In this h chiefly by the failure of the industrial workers of Great Britain to franchise of 1867 and to secure working-class dominance in Parlia explanation of this failure emphasized the British worker's cravin ability' and enhanced social status which thus led to a willingness, i to accept bourgeois social values, life-styles, and political ideas. Bu went on to argue further that this process of the embourgeoisemen working class had itself to be explained by reference to Brita economic position in the mid-nineteenth century as the world's le nation. Only because of this na^'onal economic supremacy was it p theory of working class 'immiseration' to be controverted and for of the British labour force to enjoy living standards which were suc their bourgeois aspirations. In this way, then, in spite of their ra standpoints, Engels' analysis is very similar to Millar's in its basic discussion of the affluent worker, both are ultimately interes political situation; and this they seek to understand in terms of t social stratification, which they in turn relate to the secular tren development.
the affluent worker and thesis of Embourgeoisement 13 From the end of the nineteenth century, a Marxian, or more accurately, a para-Marxian perspective on the question of the affluent worker has been the dominant one; that is to say, it has been generally argued (or assumed) that affluence is conducive to embourgeoisement which itself leads to political conservatism, or at any rate to political apathy, within the working class. During certain periods of labour unrest and socialistic fervour, such arguments may have been somewhat subdued; but, unfailingly, they have re-emerged with conditions of greater economic and political stability. However, one basically important development from the original Marxian position should be noted. With the decline in faith in the predictive aspects of Marx's thought, embourgeoisement has ceased to be regarded as a purely temporary process which would sooner or later be checked and reversed as part of the logic of the auto-destruction of the capitalist system. Rather, it has come to be seen as a permanent and progressive process which is inherent in the 'affluent society' of the modern West and which reflects, in fact the logic of the long-term evolution of industrialism . The industrial society of the future, it has been claimed, will be an essentially 'middle-class' society; as the age of scarcity gives way to the age of abundance, the idea of a working class with its own distinctive way of life, values, and goals is one which becomes increasingly obsolete. 5 So far as Great Britain is concerned, this new version of the embourgeoisement thesis came to particular prominence in course of the last decade. The circumstances which lent it force are now part of the familiar history of these years and we need refer to them here only very briefly. Economically, the 1950s were characterized by a relatively rapid rise in living standards and, most significantly, by a marked growth in the number of 'middle-range' incomes. This resulted in an increasing overlap, in terms of income, between those in white-collar and manual occupations ; and, concomitantly, former differences in patterns of consumption were also much reduced as manual workers considerably increased their ownership of consumer durables and, in a growing number of cases, began to buy their own homes. Politically, these same years were ones of undisputed Conservative dominance. The three successive electoral victories of the Conservative party, with rising majorities, were without historical parallel, while the Labour vote showed ominous signs of secular dechne. Moreover, there were indications that in the areas of the country which were economically most progressive, this fall in the Labour vote was due to some significant extent to loss of support from among the industrial working class, either through defections or through new voters failing to follow in the traditional pattern.
In these circumstances, then, it can scarcely be regarded as surprising that the thesis of the progressive embourgeoisement of the British working class should prove to be an attractive one. The argument that British society was becoming increasingly middle-class provided the obvious means of linking together the outstanding economic and political developments of the period. It was, in fact, an argument accepted by spokesman of both the right and left, by numerous j social commentators, and by not a few political scientists and soci ever, the existence of this general consensus of opinion did not al though it may have served to obscure it -that the thesis of 'the middle-class' lacked any satisfactory validation. It remained merel tion, or at best an inference, which it seemed reasonable to make the socio-political situation in Britain at the end of the 1950s. Alth stantial evidence might be persuasive, very little direct evidence co to support the specific proposition that manual workers and their in the process of being assimilated on a relatively large scale i ways of life and middle-class society.6 itself or adjacent housing areas. The sample was also constructed so as to enable comparisons to be made between workers at different skill levels and involved in different types of production system.9 For further comparative purposes, we also took a sample of 54 lower-level white-collar workers based on two of the firms. The manual workers were interviewed twice; once at their place of work and then again, together with their wives, in their own homes. The white-collar workers were interviewed at home only.10
Our manual workers proved to have a broadly comparable range of incomes to the white-collar workers and also differed little from the latter in their ownership of various high-cost consumer goods and in house ownership. Other characteristics of the manual sample which should be noted were the following: (i) a majority (55 per cent) lived outside of typically working-class localities such as those in the centre of the town or the council estates ; (ii) 71 per cent were not natives of Luton or of the Luton district; and (iii) only 13 per cent had ever had the experience of being unemployed for longer than a month. We would then claim that such a sample could be regarded as one that was reasonably appropriate to our purposes.
We cannot here present anything like a full account of the findings of our research; for apart from obvious limitations of space, the analysis of our material is still incomplete.11 What we aim to do is to set out some general results which have a direct bearing on what we believe must be regarded as major elements in the embourgeoisement thesis. In an earlier paper distinctions were made between the economic, normative and relational dimensions of change in class structure;12
and it is in terms of these that the following discussion proceeds. First, we shall be concerned with some basic features of the work situation of the men in our sample. This is a most important aspect of their class situation viewed in economic termsalthough one which has tended to be neglected because attention has been focussed on 'affluence' in the sphere of consumption. However, from our standpoint, it is not enough to know that certain manual workers can earn high incomes: what must also be known is under what conditions this affluence is achieved, and their human and social implications. Secondly, in regard to both the normative and relational aspects of class, we present data on the nature and extent of our workers' participation in community life; including data on the further vital but again often neglected question of the extent to which the manual-nonmanual division in work continues to coincide with a major line of status-group demarcation. Then finally, and again under the normative heading, we concentrate on the political attitudes and behaviour of our sample. As we have already observed, political orientations have been the matter of ultimate interest in most discussions of 'the affluent worker' thus far; and it is for this reason that they are singled out for special attention in this paper.
(i) Employment and the work situation . An obvious but basic fact about the men in our sample is that they are 'affluent' primarily because of their employment in large-scale, technologically advanced manufacturing enterprises. Their role as 1 6 JOHN H. GOLDTHORPE et al.
wage workers in such enterprises is indeed fundamental to the und their entire social existence. On the one hand, it is through filling thi are able to achieve a level of income which makes a 'middle-class* st style of living available to them. On the other hand, however, it can as rank-and-file industrial employees, their typical life experiences a are in several ways significantly different from those of most workers 'middle-class' occupations.
To begin with, it could be said that many of the workers with wh concerned appear to experience their work as little more than mere is, as an expenditure of effort which offers no reward in itself motivated primarily by the extrinsic reward of payment. It is true performing the more skilled jobs -toolmakers, millwrights, setter some degree of satisfaction directly from their work. But for the la those in the less skilled jobs -in particular, the machinists and assem rather the case that their work, as experienced, involved various kinds o for example, lack of variety, lack of challenge, lack of autonomy a relatively unpleasant physical conditions. This situation was indicated by the answers we received to a numbe in our interview schedule. For instance, of the machinists and assem cent reported that they found their work monotonous, 84 per cent t command their full attention, and 47 per cent that it was physically over, we also asked our respondents in a quite general way: 'Did you your other [i.e. previous] jobs more than the one you have now?' In t machinists and assemblers 62 per cent said that they had, as too did the more skilled men and 44 per cent of the process workers. A given revealed that overwhelmingly these men assessed previou preferable on the grounds of the greater intrinsic rewards which th when compared with their present work or, at any rate, because th they had entailed were less severe. The kinds of jobs most frequently this respect were either ones at a higher skill or status level than t present work, or jobs in agriculture, transport, services, and o employment which do not usually involve the physiological or rigours of mass-production industry. Over a quarter of the more sk and over three-quarters of the semi-skilled men has held jobs in on these two categories at some earlier time in their working lives.
The implication of these findings is, then, that for a sizeable prop workers in our sample, their attachment to their present employm of a pecuniary kind. In other words, it would appear that these me way arrived at a decision to abandon work which could offer them degree of immediate satisfaction in order to take a job which enables a higher level of monetary reward. Confirmation that such an inst of work was in fact the prevalent one, within all groups in the sampl by the answers we received to a further question of a more direct kind. After enquiring of our respondents if they had ever seriously thought of leaving the firms for which they now worked-just under half said they had -we went on to ask: 'What is it, then, that keeps you here?' From the replies which were made, it was clear that by far the most important consideration was the high level of pay which could be earned. This was mentioned by 65 per cent of the more skilled men and by 69 per cent of the semi-skilled workers. Moreover, of the latter 1 in 4 (24 per cent) stated that 'the money' was the only reason why they remained in their present employment.13 By contrast, less than 1 in 3 (29 per cent) of the skilled men and only 1 in 7 (14 per cent) of the semi-skilled made any mention of staying in their present job because they liked the work they did.
When this same question was put to the men in our white-collar sample, a significantly different pattern of response was produced. Only two men out of the 54 said that they stayed in their present jobs simply because of the level of pay, and only 30 per cent made any reference to pay at all. On the other hand, liking the work they did was the reason which was most frequently mentioned, being given by 2 white-collar workers out of 5 (39 per cent).14 It would appear, then, that for many of the affluent workers we studied, affluence has been achieved only at the cost of having to accept work as an activity largely devoid of immediate reward -as an activity which is chiefly a means to the end of a high level of income and consumer power. In this respect, the more skilled men may be regarded as fortunate in being able to find high-paying jobs which can also offer some opportunity for fulfilling more expressive needs -even though they too, it would seem, still view their work in a largely instrumental way. For the men lacking in skills -or, more accurately, skills in high demand -the road to affluence has often been a much harder one. Most commonly, on our evidence, it has meant taking and holding down jobs which offer higher pay than do most other types of manual work because of their inherent strains and deprivations. In this way, therefore, a 'middle-class' standard of income and consumption has been brought within reach; but only through a kind of work which is not typically part of white-collar experience. 15 Moreover, it may also be observed that the nature of the work they perform is not the only cost of affluence to the men in our sample: the amount of work they do and when they do it are also important considerations. Even with the relatively high rates of pay which they enjoyed, the workers we studied could rarely earn wage packets of upwards of ^20 for a normal week's work. For the majority, overtime formed a regular part of their employment and was an essential element in their high standard of living. During the period, in which our interviews were being carried out, we estimate that the men in our sample were averaging around 5 J hours overtime per week. This would imply an average working week of from 48 to 50 hours. Furthermore, three-quarters of those in our sample were also permanently on shift work, which is, of course, an increasingly common aspect l8 JOHN H. GOLDTHORPE et al.
of employment in modern capital-intensive plants. The majority shifts were required to do regular periods of night work, while th on some kind of double day-shift system. In this latter group, t favourably disposed towards shift work and those who disliked i equal in number. But among the men who had to work 'night attitudes were twice as frequent as favourable ones. The most com of these men were to the effect that night working impaired th psychological well-being, that it led to the disruption of family li interfered with their leisure and 'social' pursuits.
Systematic overtime and shift working must then be seen as an the way of life of most of the affluent workers we studied. Not characteristic features of their employment, but they also have workers' activities outside the factory -consequences of a co Moreover, in the particular form in which our workers experien constraints could not be said to figure prominently in the social white-collar occupations.
Finally, on the theme of employment, there is one other w manual workers with whom we are concerned remain significant from most varieties of white-collar man. This is in terms of advancement -of making a career -within the enterprise in whi general, opportunities for rising from the ranks, whether of manual employees, are known to be contracting in most kin organization. But still, the prospects for office workers, technician and so on are appreciably better than are those for men on the sh latter, even where their firms follow policies of 'promotion from Luton firms attempted to do -the chances of being promoted m slight, if only because of the small number of openings which ex the large number of possible candidates.
Among the manual workers we studied, the fact that advancem enterprise was unlikely was fairly well recognized. In reply to a interview schedule, only two men out of our sample of 229 were their chances of promotion even to foreman level as being Very g of the skilled men and 30 per cent of the semi-skilled though thei respect were 'fairly good', but 37 per cent of the former group an the latter felt they were 'not too good' and 19 per cent and 25 per regarded the position as being 'hopeless'. 16 We also put the follow our respondents: 'If a worker of ability really put his mind to it firm do you think he could get in the end?' The answers we rece influenced by the different 'myths and legends' of the three firm workers came ; but overall less than half (45 per cent) believed that achieve managerial level; 40 per cent thought he would reach a su and most of the remainder (13 per cent) said that he would get n the affluent worker and thesis of Embourgeoisement 19
When comparable questions were put to our white-collar sample, a notably different picture emerged: 63 per cent believed that their chances of promotion to the next highest grade were Very good' or 'fairly gooď, as against 37 per cent having more pessimistic views; and similarly, 65 per cent of the sample believed that a rank-and-file white-collar worker with ability and determination would be able to make his way into a managerial position.
These varying assessments of chances of promotion are not only significant in reflecting, as they do, differences in objective life situations: they are important also in the way in which they are associated with marked differences in the entire pattern of aspirations between the two occupational groups in question. For example, among the white-collar workers the greater optimism about promotion coexists with a general desire to achieve advancement within the firm. When asked how they would like the idea of promotion, 87 per cent of the white-collar workers responded positively. By contrast, when the manual workers were asked how they would like the idea of being made a foreman, a positive response was forthcoming from 62 per cent of the more skilled men and from only 43 per cent of the semiskilled. 17 On the other hand, though, one alternative means of 'getting ahead* had more often been hopefully thought about by the manual workers: nearly twofifths of the latter (37 per cent) as opposed to one fifth of the white-collar sample (19 per cent) had seriously considered starting up in business on their own account; and in fact there were 28 men in the manual sample (12 per cent) who were actually trying to do this at the time or who had tried in the past.
However, undoubtedly the greatest difference of all in this respect lies in the fact that for manual wage workers -whether affluent or not -the main hope for the future cannot be in 'getting ahead* in any of the more usual 'middle-class' senses. Rather, it must rest in the progressive increase of the rewards which they gain from their present economic role. Individually, they can certainly help to realize this by being occupationally and geographically mobile -by being prepared to 'follow the money*. And it was clearly in this way that many of the men in our sample had achieved their affluent condition. But even then, to a greater extent than with most white-collar employees, in industry at least, the economic future of these workers still remains dependent upon collective means; that is to say, upon trade-union representation and trade-union power.
In this latter connection, two basic points may be anticipated from the fuller treatment of unionism among our affluent workers which we shall present elsewhere. First, our research provides no indication that affluence diminishes the degree of workers' attachment to unionism -although it may well be important in changing the meaning of this adherence. The factories with which we were concerned were, in effect, quite valuable recruiting grounds for the unions in that they attracted a high proportion of workers who were not union members but who subsequently became enrolled; 38 per cent of the men in our sample had become unionists only after taking up their present employment. Secondly, while the large majority of the workers we studied could not be said to b
to their union as part of a great socio-political movement or even a they nonetheless recognized well enough the practical importance and of union strength in regard to the day-to-day issues of industr at shop and factory levels in particular. In brief, one could say tha men in question a union was, at least, an organization to which, a it paid them to belong ; it had definite instrumental value. The fac could now also be said of an increasing number of non-man notably in commerce and administration, cannot be denied. Bu is not so much evidence of embourgeoisement as of a reverse pro work situation of many white-collar employees is becoming i
closer to that of their blue-collar counterparts.
(ii) Community life. As we have already noted, the majority of affluent workers were not natives of Luton. They were, rathe migrated to the town during the last two decades in search chiefly and better housing. We have also observed that more than half n which could not be described as typically working-class. This is c with the fact that a similar proportion (57 per cent) own or are buy These characteristics of the sample are then perhaps sufficient in indicate that many of the men we studied do not share in what is 'traditional* pattern of community Ufe among urban industrial wo families; that is, a pattern based upon residential stability and so in which kinship and various forms of communal sociability play a On the matter of kinship, this conclusion can be supported mor other of our data. For example, as a result of their geographical m proportion of the men in our sample had become physically separ kin to a degree which made day-to-day contact impossible -and s of their wives. Thus, of those who still had parents alive, only 13 men and 18 per cent of the wives had parents living within ten m themselves ; and in the case of 56 per cent of the men and 48 per ce their parents were all living entirely outside the Luton area separation from siblings was slightly less marked, since sometim moved to Luton. But, even so, only 36 per cent of the couples we majority of their closer kin (parents, siblings, and in-laws) living
The remaining couples were almost equally divided between majority of their kin living within a 50-mile radius of Luton and were for the most part yet further afield.
Given, then, that many of the couples we studied were not mem kin-based communities of the traditional working-class kind, the of whether this situation was associated with any shift towards munity Ufe which were more typically middle-class and at the sam substantial degree of social mixing with recognizably middle-c if embourgeoisement is a likely concomitant of working-class affluence, then one would expect that middle-class life styles and society would be most readily sought after among those manual workers who, as well as being affluent, have also been freed from the social controls of an established working-class community and, in particular, from the essentially conservative influence of the extended family.
The findings of our research which bear on this point are, in detailed form, rather complex: nonetheless, in general terms they are clear enough and they tend to give little support to the thesis of embourgeoisement , at least in the crude form in which it has usually been advanced.
The first point to be made is that in spite of the limits set by physical distance, kin were still relatively prominent in the social Uves of the couples we studied. As might be expected, for those couples whose closer kin were for the most part in the Luton area, social contacts with kin were far more frequent than those with persons in any other comparable category, such as neighbours, workmates, or other friends. However, even in the case of the other couples -almost two-thirds of the sample -whose kin were mostly outside of Luton, the part which kin played in their social lives was far from negligible. For example, we asked our respondents, both husband and wife : 'Who would you say are the two or three people that you most often spend your spare time with [apart from spouse and children] ? For those couples whose kin were largely in the area, kin made up 41 per cent of the persons named; but still with the remaining couples, 22 per cent of those mentioned were kin nonetheless. Similarly, when we asked wives about the persons they had visited, or had been visited by, during the past week, kin accounted for 52 per cent of the total for wives in the former group but still for 20 per cent for those in the latter. In the case of those couples who were largely separated from their kin, these findings would, then, suggest one or both of two things : first, that the few kin which these couples had in the Luton area tended to be seen quite often and, second, that fairly close contact was kept with other kin regardless of their distance.19 However, what is perhaps of greatest significance about the couples in question is the way in which their relative isolation from kin is compensated for. Primarily, it would seem, the place of the absent kin is taken not by friends chosen from among the community at large but, rather, by neighbours , roughly defined as persons living within ten minutes' walk. For instance, in answer to the question on the two or three people with whom spare time was most often spent, neighbours represented 47 per cent of those mentioned but other friends only 12 per cent.20 Again, on the question of wives' visiting and visitors, neighbours accounted for 54 per cent of those involved and other friends for only 26 per cent. In this connection, a comparison with the white-collar sample is intructive. The whitecollar couples, being less mobile, were somewhat less likely to be separated from their kin than the manual sample as a whole; and kin were a clearly more important element in their pattern of sociability than in that of the manual couples who had moved away from the centres of their kinship networks. But the fu difference between these two groups was that the white-collar co their greater amount of contact with kin,21 also has far more con who were not neighbours or workmates. Thus, of the persons white-collar couples spare time was mostly spent, 29 per cent wer kind, and such friends also accounted for 3 1 per cent of the per collar wives visited or were visited by. 22 What this suggests to us is, then, that among the affluent work middle-class norms had, as yet at least, only a very limited influen sociability. In cases where kinship could not provide the basis of s workers and their wives appeared to turn most readily for su panionship to those persons who, as it were, formed the next cir acquaintance -that is, persons living in the same neighbourhood. of friends from among people with whom their relationships wer degree 'given', in the way that relationships with kin and neighbou not a highly characteristic feature of their way of life. Compared collar couples, they were apparently lacking in motivation, an in the requisite skills, for this kind of social exercise. 23 One further finding from our interviews supports this interpr typical feature of middle-class social life that couples entertain eac own homes. We therefore asked our respondents how often they h round and who were the people who regularly came. Briefly, wha that the couples in the manual sample did not entertain at home a frequently as did the white-collar couples and, further, that they w to confine such entertaining to their kin. Workmates and neighb other friends, were all less often invited than in the case of the white
In other words, it would seem that among our affluent workers m of sociability remain less influential than the 'traditional' workingthe home is a place reserved for kin and for very 'particular' frie Finally, there is the question of how far our affluent workers a were actually involved in what might be regarded as middle-c what extent did white-collar persons figure in their social lives? In interpretation of our findings is not very difficult. They point f considerable degree of status segregation. For example, to revert t on persons with whom spare time was mostly spent, 75 per cent of couples in the manual sample were also manual workers and their 17 per cent were persons of clearly higher status in occupational te of the latter, 29 per cent turn out to be kin. We can in fact say that 2 couples in our sample find their chief companions entirely among further 47 per cent entirely among kin or persons of similar occu On the other hand, only a very small minority -about 7 per cent appear to associate predominantly with unambiguously middle-clas A similar picture also emerges if we turn from informal relationships to examine participation in formal organizations. Such participation was not at a high level among our affluent workers or their wives, and was significantly lower than in the white-collar sample. For the men, the average number of organizations belonged to (not counting trade unions) worked out at less than 1-5 and for the wives was as low as 0*5. However, more relevant than their number for present purposes was the character of these organizations: they were not of a kind likely to lead to association with middle-class people, or at least not in any intimate way. Predominantly, they were ones either almost entirely working-class in membershipsuch as working-men's clubs, angling or allotment societies -or, if more mixed in their social composition, organizations which had some fairly specific purposereligious, charitable, sporting etc. -and a well-defined internal hierarchy. What was largely lacking among couples in the sample was participation in organizations with some middle-class membership but with primarily diffuse, 'social* functionssuch as, say, drinking or recreational clubs -or participation in organizations of any kind in which other manual workers and their wives were not in a large majority. In general, then, one may say that there is little indication that the affluent workers we studied are in process of being assimilated into middle-class society.
Nor, in the great majority of cases, do they even appear to see in this a style to be emulated. On our evidence there is thus little need, and little basis, for the hypothesis that non-traditional norms and status aspirations accompany these workers' enjoyment of a relatively high standard of living. Furthermore, the small number of cases where some degree of embourgeoisement does appear to be in train suggests that many other factors are involved here apart from that of affluence itself. For the most part, those ways in which the social lives of the men and women in our sample do most obviously diverge from a more traditional working-class pattern are, in our view, largely to be explained as the consequences of job and residential mobility, and also perhaps of the constraints imposed by overtime and shift working; that is, as the consequences of certain objective conditions of their relatively prosperous existence to which these workers and their wives have been obliged to adapt. And the direction of these changes, we would suggest, is not towards 'middle-classness', but rather towards what might be termed a more 'privatized' mode of living.25 In contrast with the communal and often kin-based sociability of the traditional working-class locality, the characteristic way of life among the couples we studied would appear to be one far more centred on the home and the immediate family; a way of life in which kin and neighbours, although still relatively important, figure in a more selective and limited way, and in which friends and acquaintances in the middle-class style do not, as yet at least, play any major part.26 (iii) Political orientations . It was not the aim of our research to provide a direct test of the argument that growing affluence and the process of embourgeoisement were causing national, secular decline in the Labour Party's electoral support among the working class. For this purpose, a very different kind of research des have been required. With our relatively small sample of affluent w sought not simply to discover the pattern of their voting behaviour but this in its socio-economic context and to form some idea of the meani party support held for our respondents. However, in presenting our f this section some straightforward voting figures are a necessary start and are in themselves not without interest.
At the General Election of 1959, 212 out of our sample of 229 were e vote. Of these 212, 71 per cent reported voting Labour as against Conservative and 3 per cent Liberal, with the remainder abstaini variations in voting occurred between the different occupational group our sample, and thus this overall pattern to some degree reflects decisio constructing the sample.27 Nonetheless, even allowing for this and for that our respondents were males in the younger age groups, there can doubt on these figures that their level of Labour voting was, to say the not lower than that which has been indicated for manual workers gener basis of national surveys;28 and this, it may be remarked, was at the e which the effects of working-class affluence were supposed to hav heavily against the Labour Party. In fact, our data show that to a very l our affluent workers have been quite stable in their support of Labour:
have been regular Labour voters from 1945 onwards or from whenever voted as opposed to 12 per cent being regular Conservative supporters.
among the remainder -the uncommitted or 'switchers' -there wa whatsoever towards greater Conservative voting in course of the 1950s when our respondents were asked how they intended to vote at the fo general election (1964), the division between the two main parties 69 per cent Labour, 12 per cent Conservative. Thus, while the data to produce from our sample may be insufficient in themselves to refute the thesis which links working-class affluence with a political shift to they are at all events conspicuously at odds with this and show, at leas a shift certainly does not occur in any necessary and automatic way.
Furthermore, that no simple relationship exists between affluence an also indicated by our more detailed analyses. It is true that within our sa is a tendency for the degree of Conservative voting to rise slightly wi of both the husband's and the family's income. Again, the percenta servative voters in the 1959 election was higher among those who repo their standard of living had risen during the last ten years than it was a who reported no such rise. However, in both of these cases, it turns ou relationship in question is much reduced -and sometimes even eliminat holds constant various other factors to which we shall shortly turn limitation, it may be added, also applies to the relationship between Co voting and house ownership to which several writers have attached significance.29 And moreover, in this case, the association was not in fact a particularly stable one: 15 per cent of the present owner-occupiers in our sample had been regular Conservative voters as against 7 per cent of those who were not owneroccupiers; but only 12 per cent of the former group compared with 11 per cent of the latter were intending to vote Conservative at the next election.
It would then seem fairly clear that the voting patterns of the workers we studied cannot be satisfactorily explained as any kind of straightforward reaction to their affluent condition. The evidence cannot be made to fit such an interpretation.
Instead, our findings would suggest a view which, sociologically, makes far more sense. It is that in seeking to understand the voting behaviour of the men in our sample, major emphasis must be placed not on variables relating to their income, possessions, or standard of living generally, but rather on the similarities and differences in their social experiences and social relationships within the main milieux of their daily existence. In other words, one must not jump directly from economic circumstances to political action but should focus one's attention, rather, on the social reality which lies, as it were, behind these circumstances and which at the same time makes the political action meaningful.
Consider, for example, the salient fact that, notwithstanding their affluence, the percentage of men in our sample voting Labour is, if anything, higher than one would expect on the basis of national survey data. In the explanation of this, we would suggest, the most relevant considerations include the following: (i) that the men in question are all manual wage workers employed in large-scale industrial enterprises ; (ii) that, as such, they are mostly members of trade unions ;30 (iii) that, in the vast majority of cases (96 per cent), they have been manual wage workers of one kind or another for most of their working lives ; and (iv) that, again in the majority of cases, they were brought up in working-class families (68 per cent) and have married the daughters of such families (63 per cent). Given, then, the typical pattern of past experience and prevailing social relationships which these characteristics imply -and which affluence can scarcely affect -a high Labour vote is no longer very surprising. We can understand it as resulting from a complex of mutually reinforcing traditions and group pressures, exercising their influence at work, in the family and in the local community.
This interpretation, moreover, can be extended and confirmed if we now turn again to the Conservative minority. Our data reveal, as would be predicted, that these Conservative supporters, apart of course from all being wage workers, do not share to the same extent as the rest of the sample the working-class characteristics which have just been set out. Most notably, they are more likely than the Labour voters to be men who have remained outside the union movement (22 per cent against 1 1 per cent) or who have become union members only in course of their present employment (67 per cent against 39 per cent) ; and they would also appear generally more likely to have some connection in one way or another with white-collar society -through coming from a white-collar family or having married into such a family, through having held a white-collar job wife with such a job.31 It is, then, factors such as these which sometimes considerably -the relationship between Conservative vo economic variables to which we earlier referred. For example unionists in the sample, 20 per cent intended voting Conservat compared with only 11 per cent of the union members; and wi categories no association between income and vote is any long Similarly, if we divide up the sample according to the degree 'white-collar affiliation', we find that 21 per cent of those in the ' intending Conservative voters as against 10 per cent in the 'interm and only 7 per cent in the 'low' group.32 And once more, income le have no effect on vote when this further factor is held constant. In therefore, it becomes evident that the link between affluence and v an indirect and uncertain one. The Conservative voters in our sa this point no less than the affluent supporters of Labour.
Finally in this section, we turn from the social correlates of part consideration of the voting behaviour of our respondents from their view. In our interviews, we asked all those who had formed a fairly ment to a party the reason for this; and the analysis of replies we r case of the Labour majority in particular, are an important sup foregoing discussion.
To begin with, the emphasis which we previously gave to certain c istics in understanding the high Labour vote in our sample is q confirmed by Labour supporters' own explanation of their position most frequent kind of reason given for an attachment to the Labour phrased in terms of class and of class and family custom: the Labour party which 'stands for the working class', which 'looks after ordi people like us' or, simply, the party which 'working-class peopl fact, 70 per cent of the 147 regular Labour supporters supplied reasons in this vein. In the way, therefore, these men would appear from the mass of Labour voters in the country as a whole. Abrams has reported on the basis of a national survey, carried out in i960, regarded by the large majority of its adherents as being an essentiall To this extent, then, there is again evidence that affluence has, in it as yet to erode the class basis of Labour support. At the same time, though, it is worth noting that the only other k tion which Labour voters at all frequently provided was one which attachment to the party of a somewhat less affective and more cal Just under a quarter (24 per cent) gave reasons for their suppo particular material advantages which they expected to gain from cer Labour's policy -in relation, for instance, to social services or the of the economy. Such a position is not, of course, in any way incon sharp awareness of 'class' interests: nonetheless, where an outlook of this kind prevails, the tie to the Labour Party is one which could quite conceivably be broken -even if only temporarily -given circumstances which make Conservative policy appear the more attractive in economic terms. And there are other data from our interviews which suggests this same possibility. 34 However, it should be added here that it was among the Conservative voters that calculative attitudes of the sort in question were most strongly in evidence. Exactly half of the 24 'stable* Conservative voters stated that they supported this party because they believed that they personally were better off economically under Conservative government or because they felt that the Conservatives had the better men and policies for creating general prosperity. On the other hand, instances of a more traditionalisme attachment to the Conservatives of a 'deferential' kind were rare ; and more relevantly from the point of view of the embourgeoisement thesis, we were able to find no evidence at all of the 'socially aspiring' Conservative -that is, of the manual worker who votes Conservative because of the higher status which he feels this action serves to symbolize. In this connection, it should be remembered that the Conservative supporters in our sample, to a greater extent than the Labour voters, were likely to be cross-pressured -with white-collar relationships and experience set in opposition to their present role and status as industrial workers. In their case, thus, a largely instrumental view of politics is perhaps to be more expected than any tendency to regard party choice as an attribute of class or status group membership. Our affluent workers remain, in spite of their affluence, men who l their labour power to their employers in return for wages; and, in al they will still be so at the end of their working days. Again, althou their families enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of many families, their social worlds are still to a large extent separate from latter, except where bridges of kinship, or to a lesser degree of neigh span the social distance between them. Nor is there much indication t has encouraged the desire to seek acceptance in new social milieux at levels. Thus, we would suggest, there is, as yet at least, little basis f any particular change in the political attitudes and behaviour of the apart perhaps from the spread of the more calculative -more ration to which we have referred.
We do not, of course, seek in this way to rule our the possibility t future date, when working-class affluence is more general and of lon it may prove to have political implications of major importance. But we would argue, what still remains entirely uncertain is what these will be. The assumption that they will necessarily favour the Right, political stability, has no firm basis : it may equally well be that by 19 John Millar will be again invoking the affluent worker as the so dissent and of political radicalism. 20. The remaining 19 per cent (after adding in the 22 per cent who were kin) were wo or ex-workmates. The 'neighbours' category includes 'ex-neighbours' ; i.e. persons the respondents first came to know when they were living within ten minutes' w 21 . Kin accounted for 3 1 per cent of the persons with whom the white-collar couples most often spending their spare time, and for 28 per cent of the wives' visiting p 22. As against 15 per cent and 41 per cent respectively who were neighbours. The rem persons mentioned by the white-collar couples as leisure time companions were wor 23. In regard to the comparisons which we have made both between the white-collar and the manual couples who are largely separated from their kin and between the group and the other manual couples, it should be noted that no great differences o the actual numbers of persons mentioned either as leisure time companions or as visiting partners. Thus, to think in terms of the 'substitution' of neighbours (rather other friends) for absent kin would appear appropriate. 24. The questions asked were: 'How about having other couples round, say for a meal, for the evening: how often would you say you do this, on average?' and then 'W you have round -are they friends, relatives or who?' 15 per cent of the manual sa against 7 per cent of the white-collar sample said that they never had couples rou 54 per cent as against 76 per cent said they entertained in this way once a month o Of the couples entertained by the manual workers, 57 per cent were kin compare 45 per cent in the case of white-collar workers. 25. Cf. Goldthorpe and Lockwood, Affluence and the British Class structure , pp. 26. As evidence of the degree of 'privatization' within the sample it may be noted th question of the two or three people with whom spare time was most often spent, 7 pe of the couples could not mention even one person in this connection and 21 per ce only mention one between them. The average number referred to by husband and together was under three. Again, in the case of visits made by and to the wives, the r persons involved appears much narrower than that suggested in most studies 'traditional' worker. Only 3 per cent of the wives mentioned seeing more than 
